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Guanxi is a specific part of Chinese business environment. Since the openness of 
China,  it  seems  that  a  contradiction  appears  between  the  constraints  of  corporate 
governance  and  the  cultural  and  traditional  behaviour  in  business.  Most  of  west 
analyses consider that guanxi is only a form of corruption and therefore it should be 
fight it out. The originality of our work is to frame these questions in the context of 
recent concepts such as communities of practice and epistemic communities. Based 
on these concepts, we consider that the firm can be analysed from a dual perspective: 
cognitive and organisational. The first one belongs to the guanxi logic and the second 
one to the corporate governance. According to these framework, we point out the fact 
that  guanxi  provides  an  innovative  network  in  order  to  diffuse  and  enhance 
knowledge.  
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Guanxi is a specific management of Chinese firms. According to [1], guanxi is defined as the 
existence of relationship between people who share a group status or are related to a common 
person.  Guanxi  is  more  focused  on  informal  relation,  non  normative  agreements,  even 
sometimes with form of corruption. The role of guanxi is a good example of an entrenched 
cultural norm under pressure from international trends [2]. Since the Chinese entry in WTO, 
Chinese economy has also to be close to the international norms in order to develop trade, 
financial  architecture  and  IDE,  notably  according  to  the  OECD’s  norm  of  corporate 
governance. In this way, an apparent contradiction appears between the openness of China 
and the strong cultural’ behaviour of Chinese manager.  
 
The aim of this article is precisely to show that guanxi is not so opposed to the international 
constraints because it provides a support of knowledge creation, necessary in a context of the 
knowledge-based economy. In other words, Chinese firms have to combine both international 
pressures and cultural habits in order to keep this advantage.  
 
The originality of our work is to frame these questions in the context of recent concepts such 
as communities of practice ([3]; [4], [5]) and epistemic communities [6]. Based on these 
concepts, we will show that the firm can be analysed from a dual perspective: cognitive and 
organisational  [7].  The  first  one  belongs  to  the  guanxi  logic  and  the  second  one  to  the 
corporate governance.  
 
In the first part, we present the recent evolution of Chinese firms in order to point out the 
pressures of international norms of corporate governance. The second part is devoted to a 
short presentation of the corporate governance versus guanxi features. The third and last part 
explains that, despite the pressures of normative corporate governance, guanxi appears as a 
support of knowledge creation and enhances the performance of the firm.  
 
 
1. Recent evolution and characteristics of Chinese firms
2  
 
Since the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th CPC Central Committee in 1978, China has 
achieved  some  reform  in  state-owned  enterprises  [SOEs].  The  primary  goal  of  leaders  in 
China is to maintain strong economic growth and increase prosperity. To do so, they will have 
to  confront  a  number  of  problems,  particularly  the  debt-ridden  financial  system  and  the 
inefficiency of state-owned enterprises [SOEs]. That massive waste of capital under China's 
socialist  market  economy  cannot  be  stopped  without  fundamental  reform,  in  particular, 
privatization and rule of law. 
 
Private firms were illegal in 1978, and SOEs dominated the economic landscape. Today there 
are nearly 2 million private enterprises employing more than 24 million workers, and the 
number of private enterprises is growing by more than 30 percent per year. Much of the 
growth of the private sector has been spontaneous, in the sense that privatization took place 
without  central  direction  as  opportunities  for  trade  increased,  especially  in  the  special 
economic zones. Local jurisdictions were allowed to experiment with new ownership forms, 
and, when they were successful, others sought to imitate that success.  
 
                                                 
2 This part is inspired by OECD (2007).  5 
 
The  growth  in  private  output  has  also  been  the  result  of  the  higher  productivity  of  most 
companies in the sector. The sharper incentives facing the private sector companies have 
resulted in them using less capital and labour to produce output than state companies. With 
the decision in 2005 to allow private enterprises to establish businesses in many previously 
restricted  areas,  further  improvement  in  multifactor  productivity  may  be  possible.  The 
growing importance of the private sector in supporting the economy makes it all the more 
important to further modernize the legal framework for business. The government is preparing 
legislation in three important areas: bankruptcy law, company law and the implementation of 
the constitutional amendment on property rights. The second draft of the bankruptcy law has 
now  passed  the  legislature  and  is  generally  acknowledged  to  follow  international  best 
practice.  
 
The law should clearly establish the precise claims that employees have on assets, limiting 
payments  to  wages  owed  to  employees  and  leaving  other  costs,  such  as  redundancy  and 
resettlement expenses, to social funds. Secured creditors would be more likely to lend to 
private companies under such circumstances. A new company law is under consideration. A 
reduction in the barriers to the formation of both limited and joint stock companies should be 
a priority. The upper limits on the number of shareholders in a limited company should be 
abolished, while at the lower end companies with one shareholder should be allowed. For 
both sorts of companies the minimum capital requirements needed for incorporation should be 
lowered. Such changes would facilitate the expansion of privately owned companies.  
 
The  revised  company  law  should  aim  to  improve  corporate  governance,  notably  offering 
better protection to minority shareholders in both quoted and unquoted public companies and 
defining the role of corporate bodies such as the supervisory board and the duties of directors. 
In  addition,  the  proposed  anti-monopoly  law  should  cover  a  much  wider  range  of  anti-
competitive  activities  than  do  current  laws.  Finally,  rapid  introduction  of  the  laws  to 
implement the constitutional amendment on private property rights should be envisaged. 
 
 
2. Features of corporate governance and guanxi 
 
Technically, “Guanxi” stands for any type of relationship. In the Chinese business world, 
however, it is also understood as the network of relationships among various parties that 
cooperate together and support one another. The Chinese businessmen’s mentality is very 
much  one  of  "You  scratch  my  back,  I’ll  scratch  yours."  In  essence,  this  boils  down  to 
exchanging favours, which are expected to be done regularly and voluntarily.  
 
"Guanxi" can take on many forms. It does not have to be based on money. It is completely 
legal in their culture and not regarded as bribery in any way. So, there is no need to feel 
uncomfortable about it. Trustworthiness of both the company and individual is an important 
component. Following through on promises is a good indication of this. Treating someone 
with courtesy while others treat him or her unfairly is another aspect. Frequent contact fosters 
friendship as well. Chinese feel obligated to do business with their friends first. There are 
risks with this system, as well. When something goes wrong, the relationships are challenged, 
and friendships quickly disappear.  
 
Corporate  governance is assumed as such a mechanism which addresses all these agency 
problems  within  a  joint-stock  company.  It  governs  relationships  between  different  factor-6 
 
owners of the firm, and in particular between capitalists and managers through allocation of 
residual claim and control rights by both explicit and implicit contracts.
3  
 
What is an efficient corporate governance system? In this regard, economists have come to 
the following conclusions: First, and most fundamentally, the residual claim and the control 
right should be matched as much as possible, i.e., whoever has claim to the residual and 
assumes risks should also have rights to control, or conversely, whoever has rights to control 
should  assume  risks.  Frank  Knight  (1921)  might  be  the  first  economist  arguing  for  this 
matching.
4 More recently, Harris and Raviv (1989) argue that the claim residual should match 
the  rights  to  control  [voting  rights]  because  otherwise  "cheap  vote  rights"  would  lead  to 
unqualified  people  being  more  likely  to  take  over  control  of  the  firm.  Dewatripont  and 
Tirole[7]  argue  that  residual  claim  is  incentive  schemes  for  controlling  parties  to  take 
appropriate course of action. Of course, full matching between residual claim and control 
rights is impossible, and otherwise there would be no agency problem at all.  
 
Second, managerial compensation should be more closely linked to performance of the firm, 
rather  than  fixed  by  contract.  In  other  words,  the  manager  should  bear  some  risks!  This 
argument has been well discussed in the literature of principal-agent theory.
5  In fact, this 
argument can be taken as a corollary of the first argument since, by his functioning as the 
marketing  member,  the  manager  holds  "natural"  control  rights  of  business  decisions,  and 
therefore must be motivated by residual sharing, given that his actions are difficult to monitor 
and to contract upon. In particular, in order to motivate the manager to improve long-term 
productivity of the firm, not just to increase total sales revenue and current profits; managerial 
compensation  should  be  more  strongly  tied  to  long-term  stock  price  performance.  In 
particular, it is desirable for the manager to hold a considerable stake in the firm as an inside 




Third, as discussed earlier, the authority of selecting and monitoring management should be 
assigned to capitalists. This argument can also be taken as a corollary of the first argument, 
since,  by  nature,  capitalists  are  inevitably  the  eventual  risk-bearers,  and  only  they  have 
adequate  incentives  to  select  good  managers  and  dismiss  bad  managers,  and  to  monitor 
managerial performance.  
 
Fourth,  the  optimal  corporate  governance  should  be  characterized  by  a  state-contingent 
control structure; that is, the control rights should be contingent on the state of nature such 
that different claim-holders control the firm in different state. [9].  
 
Fifth, in order to mitigate the free-rider problem of investors, concentration of ownership with 
large investors is preferred [10]. When control rights are concentrated in the hands of a small 
number of investors with a collectively large cash flow stake, concerted actions by investors 
                                                 
3 Focusing on corporate governance mechanism in this paper does not mean that product market competition is 
not important in disciplining management. 
4 According to him, "with human nature as we know it would be impractical or very unusual for one man to 
guarantee to another a definite result of the latter's actions without being given power to direct his work. And on 
the  other  hand  the  second  party  would  not  place  himself  under  the  direction  of  the  first  without  such  a 
guarantee." [p.270] 
5 For a survey, see Hart and Holmstrom [1987]. 
6 The evidence of strong correlation between the managerial payment and the firm's performance suggests that 
the actual residual stake held by the manager is more than proportional to his nominal stake [for a survey and 
synthesis, see Rosen [1992]]. 7 
 
are much easier than when control rights, such as votes, are split among many of them. There 
are several distinct forms that concentration can take, including large shareholders, takeovers, 
and large creditors. A substantial minority shareholder has the incentive to collect information 
and monitor the management, therefore avoiding the free rider problem. He also has enough 
voting  control  to  put  pressure  on  the  management  in  some  cases,  or  even  to  oust  the 
management through a proxy fight or a takeover [11]. Large shareholders thus address the 
agency problem in that they both have a general interest in maximization, and enough control 
over  the  assets  of  the  firm  to  have  their  interests  respected.  Similarly,  by  combining 
substantial cash flow rights with the ability to interfere in the major decision of the firm, large 
creditors can also more effectively discipline the management through their contingent control 
rights than small creditors.
78 
 
Is the guanxi become the obstacle for the company? And should eliminate the phenomena in 




3. Communities as a knowledge-based economy  
 
3.1. Cognitive duality of the firm: the emergence of communities 
 
The works of Nonaka have highlighted the crucial role of knowledge, and specifically of the 
interaction  between  tacit  and  explicit  knowledge,  for  the  emergence  of  organisational 
knowledge within the firm. The firm consists of pockets of tacit and codified knowledge and 
of data flows that sustain and permeate each other. The individuals within these firms possess 
skills that can be defined as an accumulation of knowledge and experience that can be directly 
used  in  action  [12].  The  emergence  of  cognitive  communities  enriches  the  traditional 
approach of governance structures [13,14] by identifying the places where knowledge and/or 
activities have been created for the organisation of the firm.  
 
3.2 Epistemic communities and communities of practice  
 
Epistemic  communities  and  communities  of  practice  are  the  places  where  knowledge  is 
created. The main point is that epistemic communities are actually focused on creating new 
knowledge, whereas communities of practice are focused on the successful outcome of an 
activity. In this case, the creation of knowledge is an involuntary result.  
 
Epistemic communities are defined as “small working groups made up of agents working on a 
mutually recognized sub-set of problems linked to a particular type of knowledge, and who at 
the very least, accept a procedural authority that is also acknowledged by all of them, and 
which is deemed essential to the success of their cognitive activity “ [6]. As such, they form a 
group of representatives sharing a common goal for the creation of knowledge, and a common 
structure  that  enables  them  all  to  understand  it.  Individuals  belonging  to  epistemic 
                                                 
7 However, unlike equity, debt in a peculiar way may be tougher when it is not concentrated. If a borrower 
defaults on debt held by a large number of creditor, renegotiating with these creditors may be extremely difficult, 
and the borrower might be enforced into liquidation [Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991; Dewatripont and Maskin, 
1995; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996.] 
8  Costs  of  concentrated  ownership  are  potential  expropriation  by  large  investors  of  other  investors  and 
stakeholder in the firm. For this reason, as argued by Shleifer and Vishny [1997], a good corporate governance 
system should combine some type of large investors with legal protection of both their rights and those of small 
investors. 8 
 
communities focus mainly on the creation and codification of knowledge in order to establish 
a procedure for the resolution of problems. The process of the codification of knowledge 
suggests  that  there  are  codes  that  can  be  understood  by  the  communicators.  Moreover,  a 
community is defined by the presence of a procedural authority that is either explicit or not. It 
has to mobilise the members of the community for the attainment of the cognitive objective. 
Consequently, it is the procedural authority that evaluates their membership.  
 
People accumulate knowledge based on their own experience. The quality of this knowledge 
depends on two factors. The first is the variety of the individual experiences as they interact. 
The  second  factor  is  the  “knowledge  of  experience”  This  corresponds  to  the  notion  of  a 
rational  evaluation  of  the  feed  back  from  experience  that  is  validated  by  the  procedural 
authority: It is the contribution by the members of the community to the cognitive objective 
that  is  assessed.  And  this  assessment  is  based  on  criteria  determined  by  the  procedural 
authority.  
 
Because of the heterogeneity of the representatives, the first task of epistemic communities is 
to create knowledge, which explains why it is necessary to create a codebook. From there, 
knowledge circulating within the epistemic communities becomes explicit but not codified, 
because it remains essentially internal to the community. The procedural authority validates 
the cognitive activity of a representative. This  authority assesses the contribution of each 
person to the realisation of the chosen goal within the community.  
 
The concept of a community of practice has been presented by Lave and Wenger[3] who, by 
focusing on the practices of individuals, have identified groups of people involved in the same 
practices,  who  regularly  communicate  with  each  other  in  regard  to  their  activities.  The 
members of a community of practice seek first and foremost to develop their skill in the 
practice under consideration. Communities of practice can be seen as a means to develop 
individual skills. They focus on their own members [4]. This goal is achieved by building, 
exchanging and sharing a common pool of resources [15]. 
 
Wenger  [15]  and  Brown  and  Duguid[4]  state  that  self-organisation  is  an  essential 
characteristic of communities of practice. According to Lesourne[16], self-organisation is the 
ability of a system to acquire new properties by organising itself or by modifying its own 
organisation.  Self-organisation  enables  the  system  to  evolve  without  the  constraint  of 
authority or  any kind of determinism. The system is autonomous and creates a boundary 
between itself and the other functions of the company. This creates a kind of organisational 
frontier according to the terminology used in the theory of self-organisation. 
 
More precisely, the autonomy and identity of communities of practice, which are the key 
characteristics of self-organisation, provide for the collective acquisition and processing of 
environmental stimuli [17]. Identity and autonomy are essential elements that enable the agent 
to define himself in relation to his environment and allow the members of the community to 
behave collectively. 
 
Identity can be seen in the mutual commitment of the community. It is based on the jointly 
understood  and  continuously  negotiated  activities  of  its  members.  One  member  of  the 
community  contributes  his  own  experience  to  it,  and  in  turn,  relies  on  the  knowledge 
accumulated by the community to bring his activity to a successful conclusion. This process 
takes the shape of “war stories”[4] that the members tell each other when they meet. In this 
way, they develop a jargon that is only understood by the members. It becomes a mutual 9 
 
commitment that binds the representatives within a social entity, and ensures the cohesion of 
the community and the recruitment of new members.  
 
Wenger and Lave [3] consider the practice of these communities as a vehicle for learning. On 
that basis, the community of practice assesses the individual. This assessment focuses on the 
values adopted by the individual and the progress made in his practice, both aspects being 
taken into account in the assessment.  
 
Within communities of practice, knowledge is thus essentially “know-how” [4], which is tacit 
and  socially  localised.  The  type  of  knowledge  depends  on  the  aims  and  structure  of  the 
communities  of  practice.  Consequently,  the  community  has  a  tendency  not  to  send  any 
message to the outside world. Messages are usually only exchanged between the members of 
such a community. Lastly, they generate a common pool of resources (routines, sensitivities, 
artefacts,  vocabulary,  styles,  etc.),  which  is  mainly  of  a  tacit  nature,  and  the  creation  of 
knowledge is closely related to the “socialisation” type of knowledge conversion modes [18]; 
distribution and conversion of tacit knowledge into tacit knowledge. 
 
Communities of practice and epistemic communities suggest a cognitive division of the firm 
whereby the company resembles a seamless piece of material piece of material web [19] with 
much knowledge in common, differing as to the degree and the subject of the knowledge 
(fundamental  knowledge,  languages,  rules,  etc.).  Cognitive  duality  goes  beyond  the 
organisation chart of the firm; it oversteps the internal and external boundaries of the firm. 
Nevertheless, this seamless cloth requires knowledge management.  
 
This distinction based on membership in one of these communities, enables us to highlight a 
cognitive duality central to the process of creating and distributing new knowledge within the 
firm. In other words, this cognitive duality must be accompanied by an organisational duality 
that is necessary for the cohesion and performance of the company.  
 
The creative friction between these different bodies of knowledge leads to a learning process 
by interaction, which in turn, leads to new knowledge. Epistemic communities are places 
where  real  interaction  takes  place  between  the  communities  of  practice  from  which  the 
members  of  the  epistemic  community  originate  [20].  On  a  practical  level,  cognitive 
interrelations between communities of practice and epistemic communities can be deciphered 
by referring to the Nonaka and Takeuchi [18]model of knowledge conversion.  
 
The following table presupposes the existence of a spiral for the creation of knowledge in the 
sense used by Nonaka and the SECI model [21].  
 
Tab. 1 the ‘SECI’ model and Communities of Practice - Epistemic Communities 
 
  Community of practice 
 
Epistemic community 















Knowledge  conversion  modes  provide  an  explanation  for  the  relations  between  the 
communities and the nature of the knowledge that is generated and diffused. In fine, a system 
is set up, whereby organisational knowledge is in the service of the entrepreneurial vision. 
Indeed,  the  expertise  of  the  epistemic  communities  in  their  visionary  quest,  leads  to  the 
creation of new knowledge that in turn, give rise to predominant new beliefs in the firm [22]. 
But for these beliefs to materialise, they must be diffused throughout the organisation. The 
process  of  codification  can  then  be  set  in  motion  with  the  help  of  a  suitable  medium  (a 
detailed  strategic  plan,  manuals,  specifications  for  the  suppliers,  data  sheets,  etc.).  The 
product  generated  by  the  epistemic  community  resembles  certain  formalised  elements 
[“combination”  conversion  mode].  At  this  point,  the  manager’s  task  is  to  make  the 
entrepreneurial  vision  operational.  In  order  to  do  this,  he  relies  directly  on  the  same 
communities of practice that are partly responsible for the new beliefs, as well as on the 
standard governance structures (“internalisation” mode of conversion) The existing skills are 
then  enriched  with  new  beliefs  that  turn  into  new  codified  knowledge.  This  knowledge 
enriches  both  the  quantity  and  quality  of  the  knowledge  base  upon  which  the  activity  of 
communities of practice is founded. Members of communities of practice can then make use 
of codified knowledge, as well as their own know-how, as they pursue their goal of improving 
their  practice.  This  process  of  enrichment  through  a  particular  repository  of  knowledge 
becomes a potential source of learning [23]. 
 
 
4. The influence of the guanxi on the communities 
  
Knowledge can be seen as a cultural product [24] it is the networks of people who meet and 
work with each other that often cause knowledge to migrate and be created. Technically, 
“Guanxi” stands for any type of relationship. In the Chinese business world, however, it is 
also understood as the network of relationships among various parties that cooperate together 
and support one another. 
 
Bennett  [25]  stresses  the  importance  of  culturally  derived  values  in  the  influence  of 
organizational behaviour in China. In general, Chinese societies are still bases on traditional 
Confucian  values  which  include  filial  piety,  industriousness,  the  saving  of  face  and  the 
networks of personal relationships [26]. One of the key values of Confucianism is its strong 
emphasis on inter-personal relationships and conducts [27]. 
 
Chinese believes that duality and contradictions are inherent in all aspects of life. Members of 
Confucian  societies  assume  the  interdependence  of  events,  and  understand  all  social 
interactions  within  the  context  of  a  long-term  balance  sheet;  guanxi  is  maintained  and 
reinforced through continuous, long-term association an interaction. In a high-context culture 
such as china, trust or commitment to another is secured by the potential damage to one’s 
social position or face which may result from failing to honour exchange obligations. The 
preservation of “face” and he accumulation of favours owed are the key drives underlying the 
concept of guanxi [28]. 
 
As many Chinese enterprises tend to be bureaucratic and rigid, Guanxi acts as a catalyst that 
enables a more flexible arrangement in the transfer of resources and knowledge from the 
target  company  to  the  learning  company  [29]  By  engaging  in  the  networking  activities 
through  trust  building  and  favour  exchanging,  the  learning  and  source  companies  form  a 
loosely structured network that is based mainly on guanxi [30].Guanxi could also improve the 
quality of knowledge since information passed from a guanxi partner to the receiver could be 11 
 
assured of its reliability, richness and trustworthiness, thereby reducing the receiver’s search 
cost, and allowing for more informed decision [30]. 
 
The guanxi can facilitate the transfer of tacit knowledge that is complex and difficult to be 
codified [31]. The most of the knowledge in communities of practice is tacit, and difficult to 
be codified, and can be learned implicative through the intimately interaction. And the guanxi 
can build the trust that is necessary for a person want to share his experience [32]. Moreover, 
the relationship-specific heuristics and specialized language that develop between strong ties 





Guanxi is not simply a key feature of Chinese culture, but the mother of all relationships. 
Despite  the  pressure  of  corporate  governance,  guanxi  appears  as  a  support  of  knowledge 
creation and enhances the performance of the firm.  In the modern company in china, we need 
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